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Economists have shown that large and persistent differences in productivity levels across businesses
are ubiquitous.  This finding has shaped research agendas in a number of fields, including (but not
limited to) macroeconomics, industrial organization, labor, and trade.  This paper surveys and evaluates
recent empirical work addressing the question of why businesses differ in their measured productivity
levels.  The causes are manifold, and differ depending on the particular setting.  They include elements
sourced in production practices—and therefore over which producers have some direct control, at
least in theory—as well as from producers’ external operating environments.  After evaluating the
current state of knowledge, I lay out what I see are the major questions that research in the area should
address going forward.
Chad Syverson
University of Chicago Booth School of Business
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago, IL  60637
and NBER
chad.syverson@chicagobooth.edu1. Introduction 
Thanks to the massive infusion of detailed production activity data into economic study 
over the past couple of decades, researchers in many fields have learned a great deal about how 
firms turn inputs into outputs.  Productivity, the efficiency with which this conversion occurs, 
has been a topic of particular interest.  The particulars of these studies have varied depending on 
the researchers’ specific interests, but there is a common thread.  They have documented, 
virtually without exception, enormous and persistent measured productivity differences across 
producers, even within narrowly defined industries. 
The magnitudes involved are striking.  I found in Syverson (2004a) that in within 4-digit 
SIC industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector, the average difference in logged total factor 
productivity (TFP) between an industry’s 90
th and 10
th percentile plants is 0.651.  This 
corresponds to a TFP ratio of e
0.651 = 1.92.  To emphasize just what this number implies, it says 
that the plant at the 90
th percentile of the productivity distribution makes almost twice as much 
output with the same measured inputs as the 10
th percentile plant.  Note that this is the average 
90-10 range.  The range’s standard deviation across 4-digit industries is 0.173, so several 
industries see much larger productivity differences among their producers.  U.S. manufacturing 
is not exceptional in terms of productivity dispersion.  Indeed, if anything, it is small relative to 
the productivity variation observed elsewhere.  Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, find even 
larger productivity differences in China and India, with average 90-10 TFP ratios over 5:1.
2 
These productivity differences across producers are not fleeting, either.  Regressing a 
producer’s current TFP on its one-year-lagged TFP yields autoregressive coefficients on the 
order of 0.6 to 0.8 (see, e.g., Ábrahám and White (2007) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 
(2008)).  Put simply, some producers seem to have figured out their business (or at least are on 
their way), while others are woefully lacking.  Far more than bragging rights are at stake here: 
another robust finding in the literature—virtually invariant to country, time period, or industry—
                                                 
2 These figures are for revenue-based productivity measures; i.e., where output is measured using plant revenues 
(deflated across years using industry-specific price indexes).  TFP measures that use physical quantities as output 
measures rather than revenues actually exhibit even more variation than do revenue-based measures, as documented 
in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).  Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also find greater productivity dispersion in 
their TFP measures that use quantity proxies to measure output (actual physical quantities are not available for most 
producers in their data).  Even though it is only a component of revenue-based TFP (the other being the producer’s 
average price), quantity-based TFP can be more dispersed because it tends to be negatively correlated with prices, as 
more efficient producers sell at lower prices.  Thus revenue-based productivity measures, which combine quantity-
based productivity and prices, tend to understate the variation  in producers’ physical efficiencies. is that higher productivity producers are more likely to survive than their less efficient industry 
competitors.  Productivity is quite literally a matter of survival for businesses. 
 
1.1. How Micro-Level Productivity Variation and Persistence Has Influenced Research 
The discovery of ubiquitous, large, and persistent productivity differences has shaped 
research agendas in a number of fields.  Here are some examples of this influence, though by no 
means is it meant to be a comprehensive accounting.  They speak to the breadth of the impact 
that answers to this paper’s title question would have. 
Macroeconomists are dissecting aggregate productivity growth—the source of almost all 
per capita income differences across countries—into various micro-components, with the intent 
of better understanding the sources of such growth.  Foster, Halitwanger, and Krizan (2001), for 
example, overview the substantial role of reallocations of economic activity toward higher 
productivity producers (both among existing plants and through entry and exit) in explaining 
aggregate productivity growth.  Hsieh and Klenow (2009) ask how much larger the Chinese and 
Indian economies would be if they achieved the same efficiency in allocating inputs across 
production units as does the U.S.  Models of economic fluctuations driven by productivity shocks 
are increasingly being enriched to account for micro-level patterns, and are estimated and tested 
using plant- or firm-level productivity data rather than aggregates (e.g., Campbell and Fisher 
(2004); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2008); Veracierto (2008)).  Micro productivity 
data have also been brought to bear on issues of long-run growth, income convergence, and 
technology spillovers.  They offer a level of resolution unattainable with aggregated data. 
In industrial organization, research has linked productivity levels to a number of features of 
technology, demand, and market structure.  Examples include the effect of competition (Syverson 
(2004b), Schmitz (2005)), the size of sunk costs (Collard-Wexler (2008)), and the interaction of 
product market rivalry and technology spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen 
(2007)).  Another line of study has looked at the interaction of firms’ organizational structures 
with productivity levels (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), and Schoar (2002), and Hortaçsu 
and Syverson (2007, 2009)). 
Labor economists have explored the importance of workers’ human capital in explaining 
productivity differences (Abowd et al. (2003), Fox and Smeets (2009)), the productivity effects 
of incentive pay (Lazear (2000)), other various human resources practices (Ichniowski and Shaw 
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 (2003)), managerial talent and practices (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)), organizational form 
(Garicano and Heaton (2007)), and social connections among coworkers (Bandiera, Barankay, 
and Rasul (2009)).  There has also been a focus on the role of productivity-driven reallocation on 
labor market dynamics via job creation and destruction (Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger 
(2008)). 
Perhaps in no other field have the productivity dispersion patterns noted above had a 
greater influence on the trajectory of the research agenda than in the trade literature.  Theoretical 
frameworks using heterogeneous-productivity firms like Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz 
(2003) are now the dominant conceptual lenses through which economists view trade impacts.  
In these models, the trade impacts vary across producers, and depend on their productivity levels 
in particular.  Aggregate productivity gains come from improved selection and heighted 
competition that trade brings.  A multitude of empirical studies have accompanied and been 
spurred by these theories (e.g., Pavcnik (2002); Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006); and 
Verhoogen (2008)).  They have confirmed many of the predicted patterns, and raised questions 
of their own. 
 
1.2. The Question of “Why?” 
Given the important role that productivity differences play in these disparate literatures, 
the facts above raise obvious and crucial questions.  Why do firms (or factories, stores, offices, or 
even individual production lines, for that matter) differ so much in their abilities to convert 
inputs into output?  Is it dumb luck, or instead something—or many things—more systematic?  
Can producers control the factors that influence productivity, or are they purely external products 
of the operating environment?  What supports such large productivity differences in equilibrium? 
A decade ago, when Bartelsman and Doms (2000) penned the first survey of the micro-
data productivity literature for this journal, researchers were just beginning to ask the “Why?” 
question.  Much of the work to that point had focused on establishing facts like those above—the 
“What?” of productivity dispersion.  Since then, the literature has focused more intensely on the 
reasons why productivity levels are so different across businesses.  There has definitely been 
progress.  But we’ve also learned more about what we don’t know, and this is guiding the ways 
in which the productivity literature will be moving.  This article is meant to be a guide to and 
comment on this research. 
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 I begin by setting some boundaries.  I have to.  A comprehensive overview of micro-
founded productivity research is neither possible in this format nor desirable.  There are simply 
too many studies to allow adequate coverage of each.  First, I will focus on empirical work.  This 
is not because I view it as more important than theory.  Rather, it affords a deeper coverage of 
this important facet of a giant literature, and it better reflects my expertise.  That said, I will 
sketch out a simple heterogeneous-productivity industry model below to focus the discussion, 
and I will also occasionally bring up specific theoretical work with particularly close ties to the 
empirical issues discussed.  Furthermore, for obvious reasons, I will focus on research that has 
been done since Bartelsman and Doms (2000) was written. 
Even within these boundaries, there are more studies than can be satisfactorily described 
individually.  I see this article’s role as filtering the broader lessons of the literature through the 
lens of a subset of key studies.  The papers I focus on here are not necessarily chosen because 
they are the first or only good work on their subject matter, but rather because they had an 
archetypal quality that lets me weave a narrative of the literature.  I urge readers whose interests 
have been piqued to more intensively explore the relevant literatures.  There is far more to be 
learned than I can convey here. 
  A disclaimer: some of my discussion contains elements of commentary.  These opinions 
are mine alone and may not be the consensus of researchers in the field.  
I organize this article as follows.  The next section sketches the conceptual background: 
what productivity is, how it is often measured in practice, and how differences in productivity 
among producers of similar goods might be sustained in equilibrium.  Section 3 looks at 
influences on productivity that operate primarily within the business.  This can be at the firm 
level, plant level, or even on specific processes within the firm.  Many of these influences may 
potentially be under the control of the economic actors inside the business.  In other words, they 
can be “levers” that management or others have available to impact productivity.  Section 4 
focuses on the interaction of producers’ productivity levels and the markets in which they 
operate.  These are elements of businesses’ external environments that can affect productivity 
levels.  This impact might not always be direct, but they can induce producers to pull some of the 
levers discussed in Section 3, indirectly influencing observed productivity levels in the process.  
They may also be factors that affect the amount of productivity dispersion that can be sustained 
in equilibrium, and influence observed productivity differences through that channel.  Section 5 
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 discusses what I see as the big questions about business-level productivity patterns that still need 
to be answered.  A short concluding section follows. 
 
2. Productivity—What It Is, How It Is Measured, and How Its Dispersion Is Sustained 
This section briefly reviews what productivity is conceptually, how it is measured in 
practice, and how productivity differences among producers of similar goods might be supported 
in equilibrium.  Deeper discussions on the theory of productivity indexes can be found in Caves, 
Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and the references therein.  More detail on measurement issues 
can be found in the large literature on the subject; see, for example, Olley and Pakes (1996); 
Griliches and Mairesse (1998); Blundell and Bond (2000); Levinsohn and Petrin (2003); and 
Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007).  Examples of models that derive industry 
equilibria with heterogeneous-productivity producers include Jovanovic (1982); Hopenhayn 
(1992); Ericson and Pakes (1995); Melitz (2003); Asplund and Nocke (2006); and Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008). 
 
2.1. Productivity in Concept 
  Simply put, productivity is efficiency in production: how much output is obtained from a 
given set of inputs.  As such, it is typically expressed as an output-input ratio.  Single-factor 
productivity measures reflect units of output produced per unit of a particular input.  Labor 
productivity is the most common measure of this type, though occasionally capital or even 
materials productivity measures are used.  Of course, single-factor productivity levels are 
affected by the intensity of use of the excluded inputs.  Two producers may have quite different 
labor productivity levels even though they have the same production technology, if one happens 
to use capital much more intensively, say because they face different factor prices. 
Because of this, researchers often use a productivity concept that is invariant to the 
intensity of use of observable factor inputs.  This measure is called total factor productivity, or 
TFP (it is also sometimes called multifactor productivity, MFP).  Conceptually, TFP differences 
reflect shifts in the isoquants of a production function: variation in output produced from a fixed 
set of inputs.  Higher-TFP producers will produce greater amounts of output with the same set of 
observable inputs than lower-TFP businesses, and hence have isoquants that are shifted up and to 
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 the right.  Factor price variation that drives factor intensity differences does not affect TFP, 
because it induces shifts along isoquants rather than shifts in isoquants. 
TFP is most easily seen in the often-used formulation of a production function where 
output is the product of a function of observable inputs and a factor-neutral (alternatively, Hicks-
neutral) h  s ifter: 
            ,   ,    , 
where Yt is output, F(·) is a function of observable inputs capital Yt, labor Lt, and intermediate 
materials Mt, and At is the factor-neutral shifter.  In this type of formulation, TFP is At.  It 
captures variations in output not explained by shifts in the observable inputs that act through 
F(·).
3 
  TFP is, at its heart, a residual.  As with all residuals, it is in some ways a measure of our 
ignorance: it is the variation in output that cannot be explained based on observable inputs.  So it 
is fair to interpret the work discussed in this survey as an attempt to “put a face on” that 
residual—or more accurately, “put faces on,” given the multiple sources of productivity 
variation.  The literature has made progress when it can explain systematic influences on output 
across production units that do not come from changes in observable inputs like standard labor or 
capital measures. 
  
2.2. Measuring Productivity 
  While productivity is relatively straightforward in concept, a host of measurement issues 
arise when constructing productivity measures from actual production data.  Ironically, while 
research with micro production data greatly expands the set of answerable question and moves 
the level of analysis closer to where economic decisions are made than aggregate data does, it 
also raises measurement and data quality issues more frequently.  
The first set of issues regards the output measure.  Many businesses produce more than 
one output.  Should these be aggregated to a single output measure, and how if so?  Further, even 
detailed producer microdata do not typically contain measures of output quantities.  Revenues 
                                                 
3 I use a m lt lica ely sep b tec o  to make exposition easy, but TFP can be extracted from a 
general ti tio   Kt,Lt,Mt,).  Totally differentiating this production function gives: 
u ip tiv ara le  hn logy shift
me-varying production func n Yt = Gt(At,
        
  
       
  
       
  
        
  
     . 
Without loss of generality, we can choose units to normalize ∂G/∂A = 1.  Thus when observed inputs are fixed (dKt 
= dLt = dMt = 0), differential shifts in TFP, dAt, create changes in output dYt. 
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 are typically observed instead.  Given this limitation of the data, the standard approach has been 
to use revenues (deflated to a common year’s real values using price deflator series) to measure 
output.  While this may be acceptable, and even desirable, if product quality differences are fully 
reflected in prices, it can be problematic whenever price variation instead embodies differences 
in market power across producers.  In that case, producers’ measured productivity levels may 
reflect less about how efficient they are and more about the state of their local output market.  
Recent work has begun to dig deeper into the consequences of assuming single-product 
producers and using revenue to measure output.  I’ll discuss this more below.  In the mean time, 
I will go forward assuming deflated revenues accurately reflect the producer’s output. 
The second set of measurement issues regards inputs.  For labor, there is the choice of 
whether to use number of employees, employee-hours, or some quality-adjusted labor measure 
(the wage bill is often used in this last role, based on the notion that wages capture marginal 
products of heterogeneous labor units).  Capital is typically measured using the establishment or 
firm’s book value of its capital stock.  This raises several questions.  How good of a proxy is 
capital stock for the flow of capital services?  Should the stock be simply the producer’s reported 
book value, and what are the deflators?  Or should the stock be constructed using observed 
investments and the perpetual inventory method—and what to assume about depreciation?  
When measuring intermediate materials, an issue similar to the revenue-as-output matter above 
arises, because typically only the producer’s total expenditures on inputs are available, not input 
quantities.  More fundamentally, how should intermediate inputs be handled?  Should one use a 
gross output production function and include intermediate inputs directly, or should 
intermediates simply be subtracted from output so as to deal with a value-added production 
function?  On top of all these considerations, one makes these input measurement choices in the 
context of knowing that any output driven by unmeasured input variations (due to input quality 
differences or intangible capital, for example) will show up as productivity. 
The third set of measurement concerns involves aggregating multiple inputs in a TFP 
measure.  As described above, TFP differences reflect shifts in output while holding inputs 
constant.  To construct the output-input ratio that measures TFP, a researcher must weight the 
individual inputs appropriately when constructing a single-dimensional input index.  The correct 
weighting is easiest to see when the production function is Cobb-Douglas: 
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  . In this case, the inputs are aggregated by taking the exponent of each factor to its respective 
output elasticity.  It turns out that this holds more generally as a first-order approximation to any 
production function.  The input index in the TFP denominator can be constructed similarly for 
general production functions.
4 
Even after determining how to construct the input index, one must measure the output 
elasticities αj, j ∈{k,l,m}.  Several approaches are common in the literature.  One builds upon 
assumptions of cost-minimization to construct the elasticities directly from observed production 
data.  A cost-minimizing producer will equate an input’s output elasticity with the product of that 
input’s cost share and the scale elasticity.  If cost shares can be measured (obtaining capital costs 
are usually the practical sticking point here), and the scale elasticity either estimated or assumed, 
then the output elasticities αj can be directly constructed.  If a researcher is willing to make some 
additional but not innocuous assumptions—namely, perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale—then the elasticities equal the share of revenues paid to each input.  This makes 
constructing the αj simple.  Materials’ and labor’s shares are typically straightforward to collect 
with the wage bill and materials expenditures data at hand.  Capital’s share can be constructed as 
the residual, obviating the need for capital cost measures.  (Though there is a conceptual problem 
since, as the model that follows below points out, it is unclear what makes the producer’s size 
finite in a perfectly competitive, constant returns world.)  An important caveat is that the index 
approach assumes away factor adjustment costs.  If they are present, the first-order conditions 
linking observed factor shares to output elasticities will not hold.  This can be mitigated in part 
(but at cost) by using cost shares that have been averaged over either time or producers in order 
to smooth out idiosyncratic adjustment-cost-driven misalignments in actual and optimal input 
levels, but some mismeasurement could remain. 
A separate approach is to estimate the elasticities αj by estimating the production 
function.  In this case, (logged) TFP is simply the estimated sum of the constant and the residual.  
In the Cobb-Douglas case (which again, recall, is a first-order approximation to more general 
technologies), the estimated equation is: 
ln              ln        ln        ln       . 
                                                 
4 While Cobb-Douglas-style approaches are probably the most common in the literature, many researchers also use 
the translog form (see Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 1982), which is a second-order approximation to general 
production functions, and as such is more flexible, though more demanding of the data.  There is also an entirely 
nonparametric approach, data envelopment analysis (DEA), that is used in certain, somewhat distinct circles of the 
literature.  See Cooper, Seiford, and Tone (2006) for an overview of DEA methods. 
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 Hence the TFP estimate would be           , where the first term is common across production 
units in the sample (typically the technology is estimated at the industry level), and the second is 
idiosyncratic to a particular producer. 
This approach raises econometric issues.  As first pointed out by Marschak and Andrews 
(1944), input choices are likely to be correlated with the producer’s productivity ωt: more 
efficient producers are, all else equal, likely to hire more inputs.  There is also potential selection 
bias when a panel is used, since less efficient producers—those with low ωt—are more likely to 
exit from the sample.  (As will be discussed below, the positive correlation between productivity 
and survival is one of the most robust findings in the literature.)  Then there is the issue of 
producer-level price variation mentioned above.  A substantial literature has arisen to address 
these issues; see Griliches and Mairesse (1998); Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007); 
and Van Biesebroeck (2008) for overviews. 
There is debate as to which of the many available methods is best.  In the end, as I see it, 
choosing a method is a matter of asking oneself which assumptions one is comfortable making.  
Certainly one cannot escape the fact that some assumptions must be made when estimating the 
production function. 
Fortunately, despite these many concerns, many of the results described in this paper are 
likely to be quite robust to measurement peculiarities.  When studies have tested robustness 
directly, they typically find little sensitivity to measurement choices.  The inherent variation in 
establishment- or firm-level microdata is typically so large as to swamp any small measurement-
induced differences in productivity metrics.  Simply put, high-productivity producers will tend to 
look efficient regardless of the specific way that their productivity is measured.  I usually use 
cost-share-based TFP index numbers as a first pass in my own work; they are easy to construct 
and offer the robustness of being a nonparametric first-order approximation to a general 
production function.  That said, it is always wise to check one’s results for robustness to specifics 
of the measurement approach. 
 
2.3. A Model of Within-Industry Productivity Dispersion 
  Given the large differences in productivity within an industry that I discussed above, a 
natural question is to ask how they could be sustained in equilibrium.  The ubiquity of this 
dispersion suggests there must be some real economic force at work, rather than it simply being 
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 an artifact of measurement or odd chance.  Here, I sketch out a simple model that shows how that 
is possible.  The model will also prove helpful in facilitating discussion throughout this survey. 
  d r x y i, earn profits given by   In ustry p oducers, inde ed b
           ,   ,           . 
R(⋅) is a general revenue function.  Ai is the producer’s productivity level, and Li is its labor 
input.  (I assume labor is the firm’s only input for the sake of simplicity.)  Productivity levels 
differ across producers.  The specific form of R(⋅) depends on the structure of the output market 
and the production function.  Revenues can also depend on an industry state D.  This can be a 
vector or a scalar, and depending on the structure of output market competition, it may include 
industry-wide demand shocks, the number of industry producers, their productivity levels, and/or 
moments of the productivity distribution.  Both the wage rate w and fixed cost f are common 
across, and taken as given by, all producers. 
 I  assume R(⋅) is twice differentiable with ∂R/∂L > 0, ∂
2R/∂L
2 < 0, ∂R/∂A > 0, and 
∂
2R/∂A∂L > 0.  If the industry is perfectly competitive, these conditions are satisfied given a 
production function that is similarly differentiable, concave in L, and where productivity and 
labor are complements.  Further, under perfect competition, all information contained in D is 
reflected in the market price P that equates total demand and supply, which the producers of 
course take as given.  In imperfectly competitive markets, the assumptions about R(⋅) place 
restrictions on the form of competitive interaction (be it monopolistically competitive or 
oligopolistic) and through this the shapes of the residual demand curves.  The contents of D will 
also depend on the particulars of the competitive structure.  For example, in a heterogeneous-cost 
Cournot oligopoly, D will contain the parameters of the industry demand curve and the 
productivity levels of the industry’s producers, as these are sufficient to determine the Nash 
equilibrium outputs and therefore revenues of each producer i.  Despite these restrictions, this 
setup is reasonably general. 
  The assumptions on the shape of R(⋅) imply that given the industry state D, each producer 
has a unique optimal employment level Li
* that is increasing in its productivity level.  Intuitively, 
the producer’s optimal employment level (which I refer to from here forward as its size), which 
is set to equate marginal revenues and marginal costs, is pinned down by increasing marginal 
costs in perfectly competitive markets and a downward-sloping residual demand curve (and 
possibly increasing marginal costs as well) in imperfectly competitive markets. 
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 Denote the producer’s profits at its opti
    ,   
 ,         ,   
 ,        
    . 
mal size by 
By the envelope theorem and the conditions on the revenue function, profits are increasing in the 
producer’s productivity level Ai.  This implies that there will be a critical productivity level A 
such that for Ai < A, profits will be negative.  A will depend in general on w, f, and the industry 
state D.  Since D may itself depend on the distribution of productivity levels in the industry, we 
will need an additional condition to determine the industry equilibrium.  This comes from an 
entry structure as follows. 
  A large pool of ex-ante identical potential entrants decides whether to enter the industry.  
They first choose whether to pay a sunk entry cost s in order to receive a productivity draw from 
a distribution with probability density function g(A) over the interval [Al, Au].
5  If a potential 
entrant chooses to receive a draw, it determines after observing it whether to begin production at 
its optimal size and earn the corresponding operating profits π(Ai,Li
*,D). 
  Only potential entrants with productivity draws high enough to make nonnegative 
operating profits will choose to produce in equilibrium.  Hence the expected value of paying s is 
the expected value of π(A,L
*,D) over g(A), conditional on drawing Ai ≥ A.  This expected value is 
obviously affected by the cutoff cost level A.  A free-entry condition pins down this value: A 
must se x e industry V
e equal to zero.  Thus A t the net e pected value of entry into th
            ,  ,        
  
     0 . 
 satisfies 
  This expression summarizes the industry equilibrium.
6  It combines the two conditions 
that all producers make nonnegative operating profits and that entry occurs until the expected 
value of taking a productivity draw is zero.  By pinning down the equilibrium distribution of 
productivity levels in the industry through determining A, it also determines the equilibrium 
                                                 
5 These bounds are essentially arbitrary as long as they span A for any possible D.  That is, a producer with 
productivity level Al is not profitable (i.e., it cannot cover its fixed costs) in any possible industry state, and one with 
productivity Au is always profitable. 
6 I’ve made two implicit assumptions in this equation.  First, V
e is exactly zero only in industries with a large number 
of producers.  I will assume there is a continuum of producers for the remainder of the discussion.  This is consistent 
with an assumption of perfect competition or monopolistic competition in the product market, though obviously 
rules out strategic oligopolistic interactions.  The model’s logic applies to industries with a discrete number of firms, 
however.  In that case, free entry condition will imply a number of producers N such that the expected value of entry 
with N firms is positive but is negative with N+1 firms.  The other assumption is that the productivity distribution 
g(A) is continuous, but the model can  be modified to accommodate discrete productivity distributions. 
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 industry state D.  The particular values of A and D depend on the exogenous components of the 
model: g(A), w, f, and s, and the functional form of R(⋅). 
  The equilibrium productivity distribution will be a truncation of the underlying 
productivity distribution g(   ifically, the equilibrium distribution (denoted γ(A)) is:  A).  Spec
         
    
       if      
0o t h e r w i s e
. 
  There are two notable features of this distribution.  First, it is not trivially degenerate; the 
model supports productivity heterogeneity under general conditions.  This is because high-
productivity producers are limited in their ability to sell to the industry’s entire market.  This 
finite optimal producer size is a consequence of the concavity of the revenue function, which in 
turn comes increasing marginal costs in perfectly competitive markets and downward-sloping 
demand curves (due to product differentiation from any source) and possibly increasing marginal 
costs as well in industries with imperfectly competitive output markets.  In either case, one can 
interpret productivity A as a factor of production that differs in quantity or quality across 
producers.  A higher level of A loosens the size constraint but does not eliminate it. 
  Second, the average productivity level in the industry will vary as the exogenous 
parameters change.  Increases in the average productivity level across plants (coming from 
parameter changes that increase A) will thus expectedly translate into higher aggregate industry 
productivity—the ratio of total industry output to total industry inputs.
7  Therefore what happens 
at the micro level feeds upwards into aggregates.  This feature reflects a major thrust behind the 
research agenda of understanding micro productivity: it teaches us more about aggregate 
productivity movements. 
  Of course, this model is very simple and leaves out many features observed in empirical 
work on productivity.  I will quickly discuss two such features. 
  As a two-stage entry and production model, the model abstracts from dynamics.  It can 
therefore be interpreted as characterizing long-run industry equilibria.  That said, versions of this 
                                                 
7 For differentiated product industries, relating an industry’s aggregate productivity level to the productivity levels 
of its component firms requires constructing a quantity index that adds up firms’ disparate outputs.  The proper 
index depends on how the product varieties enter final demanders’ utility functions.  Under standard aggregators, 
increases in the average firm-level productivity translate into increases in aggregate industry productivity (see, e.g., 
Melitz (2003)).  However, there are complications involved in empirically mapping back-and-forth between changes 
in micro-level productivity distributions within an industry and changes in aggregate industry productivity (see, e.g., 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2003); Petrin and Levinsohn (2008); Basu, Pascali, 
Schiantarelli, and Serven (2009); and Hulten (2009)). 
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 model’s type with more complex dynamics have been worked out by, among others, Hopenhayn 
(1992) and Asplund and Nocke (2006).  Further, even this simple structure hints at how the 
dynamics of reallocation—a focus of some of the literature discussed below—might work.  
Suppose the industry is initially in equilibrium and then each producer is hit with a persistent, 
independent productivity shock.  Those receiving favorable shocks will see an increase in their 
optimal size, while those hit by negative shocks will want to shrink.  Indeed, some may be hit by 
shocks so adverse that they will no longer be profitable.  And if we imagine there are still 
potential entrants who could pay the sunk cost to take a productivity draw, the environment after 
the productivity shocks may be favorable enough to induce some of them to want to do so.  Any 
adjustment to a new, post-shock equilibrium will therefore require reallocation of inputs from 
their initial locations.  Favorably shocked producers will grow, unfavorably shocked producers 
will shrink or exit, and new producers may enter the industry at a productivity level above 
exiters.  These patterns of reallocation are robust features of the data. 
  A greater limitation of the model is that a producer’s productivity is exogenous.  The 
equilibrium productivity distribution is endogenized only through a selection effect: the 
determination of who produces in equilibrium via A.  While I discuss below that selection is an 
empirically important mechanism, it is abundantly clear that producers often take actions to try 
to raise their productivity level.  In this case, the equilibrium sketched out above will not directly 
apply, though many of its basic elements will. 
  Despite the model’s simplicity and limited scope, it can form a useful conceptual base 
upon which to build the discussion below. 
 
3. Productivity and the Plant or Firm 
This section discusses factors that directly impact productivity at the micro level by 
operating within the plant or firm.  They are “levers” that management or others can potentially 
use to impact the productivity of their business.  They are akin to forces that would allow firms 
in the model of the previous section to raise their Ai draw, though most likely at a cost.  Section 4 
below will focus on influences external to the firm: elements of the industry or market 
environment that can induce productivity changes or support productivity dispersion. 
I have broken up the discussion of direct productivity impacts by category for the sake of 
exposition.  However, it’s good to keep in mind that some forces can overlap these categories, 
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 and multiple mechanisms can act in concert.  I will point out many of these across-category links 
as the discussion goes along. 
 
3.1. Managerial Practice/Talent 
Researchers have long proposed that managers drive productivity differences.
8  Whether 
sourced in the talents of the managers themselves or the quality of their practices, this is an 
appealing argument.  Managers are conductors of an input orchestra.  They coordinate the 
application of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs.  Just as a poor conductor can lead to a 
cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect poor management to lead to discordant 
production operations. 
  Still, perhaps no potential driver of productivity differences has seen a higher ratio of 
speculation to actual empirical study.  Data limitations have been the stumbling block.  The 
proliferation of production microdata has afforded a great increase in detail, but such data rarely 
contains detailed information on any aspect of managerial inputs.  Sometimes there may be a 
distinction made between blue- and white-collar or production and nonproduction employees, 
but that is usually it.  The identity, much less the characteristics, practices, or time allocation of 
individual managers is rarely known.  Furthermore, managerial inputs can be very abstract.  It’s 
not just time allocation that matters, but what the manager does with their time, like how they 
incentivize workers or deal with suppliers. 
A recent set of papers has made considerable efforts to close this measurement gap.  
Some have focused on single-industry or even single-firm case studies by necessity, given the 
detail required in the data.  More comprehensive efforts that cover a broader cross section of 
economic activity are underway, however. 
                                                 
8 I mean long proposed: Walker (1887) posits that managerial ability is the source of differences in surplus across 
businesses: “The excess of produce which we are contemplating comes from directing force to its proper object by 
the simplest and shortest ways; from saving all unnecessary waste of materials and machinery; from boldly incurring 
the expense—the often large expense—of improved processes and appliances, while closely scrutinizing outgo and 
practising a thousand petty economies in unessential matters; from meeting the demands of the market most aptly 
and instantly; and, lastly, from exercising a sound judgment as to the time of sale and the terms of payment.  It is on 
account of the wide range among the employers of labor, in the matter of ability to meet these exacting conditions of 
business success, that we have the phenomenon in every community and in every trade, in whatever state of the 
market, of some employers realizing no profits at all, while others are making fair profits; others, again, large 
profits; others, still, colossal profits.”  It is impressive how Walker’s description closely matches (albeit with the 
flowing prose typical of the time) the viewpoints of researchers over 120 years later.  We finally are becoming able, 
with the growing availability of broad-based production microdata, to test such hypotheses on a comprehensive 
basis. 
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 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)—hereafter BvR—offer one of the most comprehensive 
studies relating management practices (though not managers per se) to productivity.  They and 
their team surveyed managers from over 700 medium-sized firms in the US, UK, France, and 
Germany.  They surveyed plant managers, so the measured practices revolve around day-to-day 
and close-up operations rather than the broader strategic choices made at the executive level. 
Surveys were conducted over the phone by a questioner who shared the respondent’s 
native language.  Information was probed on 18 specific management practices in four broad 
areas: operations, monitoring, targets, and incentives.  The interviewers scored the firm on its 
practices based on these responses.  Given the inherently subjective element of this measurement 
process, BvR took several steps to enhance accuracy and consistency.  Managers were not told 
they were being scored.  Questions on practices were open-ended (e.g., “Can you tell me how 
you promote your employees?” rather than “Do you promote your employees based on tenure?”).  
Financial performance was not discussed.  The firms were small enough so that the interviewers 
would not already be aware of the performance of the firms they surveyed.  Each interviewer 
conducted dozens of interviews, allowing BvR to control for interviewer fixed effects when 
relating management scores to outcomes.  Further, over 60 firms were surveyed twice, by 
different interviewers; the correlation between the separate management practice scores for the 
same firms was 0.73. 
Much of what was scored as “best practice” management in the interviews was based on 
the recommendations of the management consulting industry.  This raises concerns about 
whether these practices are actually related to performance, or just the management fad of the 
moment.  Importantly, therefore, BvR document that higher-quality management practices (and 
higher scores) are correlated with several measures of productivity and firm performance, 
including labor productivity, TFP, return on capital, Tobin’s Q, sales growth, and the probability 
of survival.
9  The correlation between a firm’s management practice score and its total factor 
productivity is statistically strong and economically nontrivial.  Spanning the interquartile range 
of the management score distribution, for example, corresponds to a productivity change of 
between 3.2 and 7.5 percent.  This is between 10 and 23 percent of TFP’s 32 percent interquartile 
range in their sample. 
                                                 
9 The data from this paper is available on-line at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=2313 
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 BvR show two factors are important predictors of the quality of management practice in a 
firm.  More intense competition in the firm’s market, measured in several ways, is positively 
correlated with best-practice management.  Additionally, management practice scores are lower 
when the firm is family-owned and primogeniture determined the current CEO’s succession—
i.e., he is the eldest son of the firm’s founder.  (I will discuss the competition-productivity link 
more extensively in Section 4.  Interestingly, primogeniture’s tie to productivity is not about 
family ownership per se—in fact, family ownership in isolation is positively correlated with 
good management.)  These two factors are responsible for explaining most of the difference 
between the country-level average management scores in the sample.  The variation in these 
averages is largely the result of the UK and France having a left tail of poorly managed firms.  
Both countries have traditionally favored primogeniture by tradition and family-firm exemptions 
in their inheritance tax laws. 
Disentangling whether these correlations are causal is more challenging.  Perhaps 
management consultancies base their recommendations on the practices observed at successful 
firms, but some excluded factor drives both management practice and performance.  BvR, aware 
of this issue, estimate a specification using competition and primogeniture measures to 
instrument for management scores.  The notion is that the competitive and legal environments 
are orthogonal to other factors that drive management practices, at least in the short run.  The 
estimated effect of management practices on TFP remains statistically significant and is in fact 
larger than the OLS case.  This may suggest that unobserved third factors have a modest role, if 
any, and that BvR’s management practice scores reflect (albeit noisily) true managerial acumen. 
  BvR have since expanded their management practice survey program to gain greater 
coverage of business practices across economies.  Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) reviews results 
from an extension of this survey program to nearly 6000 firms in 17 countries, including fast-
growing China, India, and Brazil.  The broader results echo those above.  A particularly 
interesting pattern emerging from the early analysis is that the much lower average management 
practice scores in China, India, and Brazil are driven not so much by lower productivity across 
the board (though this is present to some extent), but in particular by a large left tail of very 
poorly managed firms.  This has obvious implications for how trade growth and its assorted 
competitive pressures might impact productivity evolution in these and other countries.  (More 
about Chinese and Indian firms’ TFP levels below.)  BvR are now further expanding the survey 
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 program to incorporate a panel element.  This will be extremely useful, as it will allow one to 
control for unobservable fixed heterogeneity across firms as well as to see how firms’ 
management practices change when their external environment does. 
    Other work in this vein includes Bushnell and Wolfram (2007), who find that power plant 
operators have nontrivial impacts on the thermal efficiency of power plants.  The best can boost 
their plant’s fuel efficiency by over three percent, saving millions of dollars of fuel costs per 
year.  Unfortunately, the data are less clear about what particular actions or attributes predict 
good plant management. 
These research lines study managerial actions and policies at levels below the executive 
suite.  Other work has focused on how those at the apexes of corporate hierarchies influence 
performance.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study top executives (e.g., CEOs, CFOs, Presidents, 
etc.) who manage at least two firms for three years each during their 1969-1999 sample period.  
Following managers across multiple firms lets them test if individual executives can explain 
variation in firms’ performance measures.  While they don’t measure productivity specifically, 
they do find that the individual manager fixed effects (particularly for CEOs) have significant 
explanatory power over firms’ returns on assets.  Adding these fixed effects to a regression of 
returns on firm and year fixed effects raises the adjusted R
2 from 0.72 to 0.77. 
These results reflect performance differences that can be explained by the identity of the 
managers.  This still leaves open the question of what the managers do or know that affects 
performance.  Bertrand and Schoar don’t have the sort of detailed management practice data of 
BvR, but they do regress their estimated manager fixed effects on two variables they observe for 
the executives in their data: age and MBA attainment.  They find that while age is not a 
significant factor, managers with MBAs have significantly higher ROA effects (by roughly 1 
percent, as compared to a mean of 16 percent).  This might be due to their more aggressive 
behavior as reflected in investment, leverage, and dividend-paying (or lack thereof) choices.  
More recent work (e.g., Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2009), Malmendier and Tate (2009)) 
has started to dig deeper into how particular CEO practices and philosophies are tied to firm 
performance. 
Other within-firm work has suggested that the human resources components of 
management, in particular, can affect productivity.  This research—see for example Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi (1997); Lazear (2000); Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003); the papers 
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 cited in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003); Shearer (2004); and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007 
and 2009)—uses highly detailed, production-line-specific data to tie non-standard HR 
management practices like pay-for-performance schemes, work teams, cross-training, and 
routinized labor-management communication to productivity growth.  These papers have 
elucidated some interesting details about the productivity effects of these practices.  For instance, 
these practices may be complements: while they may have only modest impact on productivity 
when implemented in isolation, their total impact is larger than the sum of its parts when used in 
conjunction.  Further, these practices are likely to have heterogeneous effects across production 
lines, even in the same plant, if different lines produce product variants of varying complexity.  
Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007), for example, find an interaction between the complexity 
of the production process and the ability of innovative HR management in raising productivity. 
Mas (2008) shows in a vivid case study how poor management-labor relations can have 
productivity effects.  He looks at the resale values of equipment made at plants and times where 
Caterpillar was experiencing labor strife during the 1990s.  Compared to otherwise identical 
products made at plants or times without unrest, these products had about 5 percent lower resale 
values.  This substantial productivity impact due to the implied reduction in the equipment’s 
quality-adjusted service flows totaled $400 million. 
With these and other studies, the evidence the management and productivity are related is 
starting to pile up.  Further, some of this work strongly suggests that this relationship is causal.  
Still, establishing causality definitively remains a key issue for research.  Bloom, Eifert, 
Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2009) are attempting to establish as much by using what 
many consider to be the gold standard for establishing causality: a randomized field experiment.  
They are providing management consulting to a random set of Indian firms and will compare 
productivity growth in this treatment group to that observed in a set of control firms not 
receiving the intervention.  This study could go a long way toward establishing whether or not a 
causal link exists.  Any such link would raise additional questions.  First, even if the 
interventions raised productivity, were they cost effective?  That is, would they pay for 
themselves in a market setting?  Second, given what we know about Indian firms in general, 
particularly for the left tail of the productivity distribution, if management consulting were to be 
effective anywhere, it would be in India.  Should the experiment therefore be thought of as 
measuring the upper bound of the causal effect of management practices? 
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3.2. Higher-Quality General Labor and Capital Inputs 
Management is an unmeasured input in most production functions, and hence is 
embodied in the productivity measure.  Similarly, the productive effects of inputs like (non-
management) labor and capital can also enter productivity if there are input quality differences 
that standard input measures do not capture.
10 
  There is of course an enormous literature on human capital, far too large to cover here, 
that has tied several factors to labor quality, including education, training, overall experience, 
and tenure at a firm.  Much of this work in labor economics has focused on wages as the 
outcome of interest.  A smaller set of work has looked at human capital’s impact on productivity. 
  Newer work using matched employer-employee datasets, which allow individual workers 
to be tracked across plants or firms over time, has offered evidence on the importance of labor 
quality.  Abowd et al. (2005) offer a broad survey of the early evidence from these types of 
datasets, which tend to be newly constructed and therefore still have short panel histories.  Their 
applicability for studying productivity, while limited now, will greatly increase over time.  Still, 
some progress has been made with such data.  Ilmakunnas, Maliranta, and Vainiomäki (2004), 
for example, use Finnish matched worker-plant data to show that (not surprisingly) productivity 
is increasing in workers’ education as well as age. 
As great a potential as such data may hold, the results in Fox and Smeets (2009) suggest 
that matched employer-employee data will not answer all of the literature’s burning questions.  
They use matched employer-employee records from the Danish economy to control for worker 
education, gender, experience, and industry tenure in production function estimation.  While 
these labor quality measures have significant coefficients in the production function, accounting 
for their influence only decreases the average within-industry 90-10 percentile productivity ratio 
from 3.74 to 3.36.  There is plenty of productivity variation left to be explained.  In a somewhat 
encouraging find for researchers using more limited data sets, they find that including the wage 
                                                 
10 Attempts to capture labor quality differences in labor measures rather than productivity are the impetus behind 
using the wage bill to measure labor inputs rather than the number of employees or employee-hours.  The notion is 
that market wages reflect variations in workers’ contributions to production; firms with more productive workers 
will have a higher wage bill per employee.  Of course, there are problems with this approach: wage variation might 
reflect the realities of local labor markets, or causation could be in the other direction, if more productive producers 
earn rents that are shared with or captured by employees (Van Reenen (1996); Abowd, Margolis, and Kramarz 
(1999)).  Hence, more direct labor-quality measures are needed to definitively pin down labor quality’s productivity 
contribution. 
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 bill alone as a measure of labor inputs—data that is almost always available—does almost as 
well as including the full array of their human capital measures, though they caution that wage 
bills are subject to endogeneity concerns, as discussed above.  This finding of only a modest role 
for finer labor skills measures in explaining productivity differences is echoed in Galindo-Rueda 
and Haskel’s (2005) investigation with similar U.K. data.  (Incidentally, using the decline in 
productivity dispersion as a metric of a newly measured factor’s importance in explaining 
productivity—or an R
2-type measure as Bertrand and Schoar use—is a good idea.  Studies 
seeking to explain productivity dispersion should strive to conduct and report similar exercises.) 
  Capital can also vary in quality in ways not captured with standard measures.  If capital 
vintages differ from one another in how much technological progress they embody, the common 
book-value-based capital stock measures will tend to miss variations in average capital vintages 
across producers.  Several studies have tried to measure the rate of capital-embodied 
technological progress by carefully constructing measures of the distribution of capital vintages 
within plants or firms.  Sakellaris and Wilson (2004) do exactly this using the annual investment 
histories of plants in the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures and industry-year-specific 
depreciation measures.  They estimate a production function that is standard in all respects 
except that, rather than measuring capital inputs with single dollar-valued stock, they use a 
weighted sum of the plant’s past investments.  The weights combine the cumulative depreciation 
of a particular vintage’s investment and a technological progress multiplier that they estimate.  
They assume that capital efficiency units grow at a constant rate per year, which they estimate to 
be between 8 to 17 percent per year, depending on the specification.  These numbers are striking 
in their implications about how much productivity growth can come from investment alone.  
(Note that, unlike the standard capital deepening effects of investment that serve only to shift 
labor productivity, capital-embodied technological progress also raises TFP.)  Other studies 
using different methodologies (e.g., Cummins and Violante 2002) have found somewhat smaller 
values, on the order of five percent per year.  This seems to be an area desperate for further 
evidence, given its potential importance. 
  Van Biesebroeck (2003) measures the productivity impact of auto assembly plants 
shifting to “lean” technologies, which in that context involves new capital plus a host of 
complementary practices (teamwork, just-in-time ordering, etc.).  This is also clearly related to 
the managerial practice discussion earlier.  He finds that both the entry of new lean plants and the 
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 transformation of earlier vintage plants are responsible for the industry’s acceleration of labor 
productivity growth during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Interestingly, his estimates of each 
technology’s parameters suggest that capital-augmenting productivity is the primary driver of 
labor productivity growth under lean processes, while Hicks-neutral TFP-type productivity 
drives growth in the traditional technology plants. 
  Of course, not just physical capital can have unobservable quality differences.  Certain 
types of capital may be themselves invisible—that is, intangible capital.  Such capital can include 
any of a number of concepts, like a firm’s reputation, know-how, or its loyal customer base, just 
to name a few.  Despite the difficulty in quantifying these types of capital, they can have very 
real output effects that, as such, will result in measured productivity differences.  I will discuss 
some specific cases of intangible capital in operation below, but the full breadth and depth of 
intangibles’ role in explaining productivity differences are still very much open questions. 
 
3.3. IT and R&D 
While the research described above indicates that input heterogeneity matters, the 
productivity effects of a particular type of capital—information technology (IT)—have been the 
subject of intense study.  This is rightly so; many have hypothesized that IT was behind the 
resurgence in U.S. aggregate productivity growth in the mid-1990s after 20 years of sluggish 
performance, and that IT has more generally influenced productivity patterns across multiple 
industries and countries.  Given the sheer size of GDP per capita variation that can be driven by 
even a modest change in trend productivity growth over a sustained period, it is not surprising 
that sources of such changes receive considerable research attention.  Because of this attention, I 
discuss the work done on this particular capital type separately here. 
  An overview of IT capital’s broad productivity impacts, particularly in driving the growth 
resurgence, can be found in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005, 2008) and Oliner, Sichel, and 
Stiroh (2007).  These studies document that IT-related productivity gains—both spectacular 
productivity growth in IT-producing industries and more modest changes in IT-using 
industries—play an important role in explaining aggregate U.S. productivity growth over the past 
couple of decades. 
At the same time, van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer (2008) show that the EU’s 
comparably sluggish productivity growth over the same period can be explained in large part by 
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 the later emergence and smaller size of IT investment in European economies.  Bloom, Sadun, 
and Van Reenen (2009a) suggest that it is not geography per se that matters, but rather the 
location of the owning firm.  They show U.S.-based multinationals operating in the EU are more 
productive than their EU counterparts, and this productivity advantage is primarily derived from 
IT capital.  They link their management practices data discussed above to data on IT usage to test 
for particular mechanisms through which this productivity advantage arises.  Their evidence 
points to a complementarity between IT capital and human resources practices, explaining U.S. 
multinationals’ productivity advantage in the EU. 
These broad patterns raise the question of which specific micro mechanisms actually 
underlie the aggregate relationship between IT and productivity growth.  Several studies have 
explored this issue with detailed production data.  Hubbard (2003) shows how on-board 
computers raise average utilization rates of trucks that they are installed in.  The computers 
provide dispatchers real-time information on a truck’s locations and load status, allowing them to 
better match the available cartage capacity to innovations in demand.
11 
Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) show how better computer numerically controlled 
(CNC) machining centers—automated devices that shape parts from raw material stock—raise 
productivity in the valve manufacturing industry by shortening setup times, raising speeds of 
production runs, and even allowing quicker inspections.  The appealing element of the study’s 
empirical approach is that both the products and the production process, except for the particular 
pieces of IT capital whose contribution is of interest, remain constant across observations.  The 
paper also shows that IT-intensive product design tools like computer-aided design packages 
make it easier to design customized parts, and lower setup times make multiple production runs 
less costly.  Offering a broader array of parts allows the firms to better match their production 
capabilities to their customers’ desires, increasing the surplus of their sales. 
Such a gain in surplus from product specialization raises an important broader point 
about productivity measurement.  Better customization from IT can raise firms average product 
prices.  Measures of productivity in physical units of output (e.g., number of valves per unit 
                                                 
11 Adopting any new technology, IT or otherwise, obviously has its own costs.  A new technology’s net productivity 
benefit to the adopter depends on the difference between the increased production the new technology facilitates and 
its acquisition cost.  For the marginal adopting producer, this net gain will be zero.  However, inframarginal 
producers experience positive productivity gains.  The aggregate productivity gains that any technology will offer 
will therefore also depend on the competitiveness of the technology-producing sector.  A lower markup and price for 
the technology raises both the number of inframarginal adopters and the net productivity gain that each experiences. 
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 input) may therefore not fully capture the surplus gained.  This is one case where the limit of 
most producer-level data sets to revenue-based output measures does not pose a measurement 
problem, because this sort of productivity gain would be reflected in revenues but not physical 
quantities.  (That said, the concern about price variations due to local market power or demand 
shocks creating productivity mismeasurement still applies in differentiated product settings.) 
Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell, and Zhu (2007); Bartelsman, Gautier, and de Wind (2009); 
and Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen (2009) each draw, in related but distinct ways, broader 
lines connecting IT and productivity.  Brynjolfsson et al. document case studies where IT 
enhances the speed with which firms can replicate practices they find productive in one of their 
lines of business across the entire organization.  This ability to lever-up a productivity advantage 
means successfully innovating firms displace less productive competitors more quickly.  IT thus 
raises the volatility of firm performance.  Brynjolfsson et al. test for and find this heightened 
volatility in a sample of Compustat firms in 61 industries.  In the context of the model in Section 
2, Brynjolfsson et al. essentially argue that IT reduces the concavity of the firm’s revenue 
function, allowing them to better leverage (and in a dynamic world, do so more quickly) any 
inherent productivity advantages (increases in Ai) that they develop or stumble upon. 
Bartelsman, Gautier, and de Wind (2009) further develop the notion that IT shifts not just 
the mean of the distribution of innovation outcomes but its variance as well.  Because poor 
outcomes are truncated by the option to exit—again in the parlance of the model above, firms 
drawing a productivity level below A don’t need to produce at a loss—greater variance raises the 
value of making risky innovations.  Bartelsman et al. note, however, that exit costs (absent in the 
model in Section 2) will stifle firms’ willingness to innovate because they make it harder to 
dismiss unsuccessful outcomes.  They argue that employment-protection legislation like firing 
costs makes exit more expensive and therefore reduces firms’ willingness to adopt IT.  They 
show that IT-intensive sectors are in fact smaller in countries with greater legal restrictions on 
firms’ abilities to close unsuccessful lines of business.  They cite employment production 
legislation as a major contributor to the IT gap documented by van Ark, O’Mahony, and Timmer 
(2008).  (I will further discuss the role of flexibility in input markets further in Section 4 below.) 
Faggio, Salvanes, and Van Reenen (2009) document that within-industry productivity 
dispersion in the UK has trended upwards over the past couple of decades.  They relate this 
increased dispersion to the growth in wage dispersion that has occurred over the same period in 
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 the UK and almost every other developed economy.  It would be interesting to see if similar 
productivity spreading is occurring in concert with wage dispersion growth in these other 
economies.  More directly applicable to the theme of this section, however, is that Faggio et al. 
show that industries which experienced the greatest growth in productivity dispersion also saw 
the largest increases in IT capital intensity.  This is yet more evidence tying IT to greater 
productivity variance. 
There is a long literature linking R&D and productivity, and recent additions to it have 
focused on exploring the ties at the micro level.  As with many input-based stories of 
productivity differences, the difficulty is in separating correlation from causation.  There are 
many reasons why more productive firms might do more R&D, suggesting that some of the 
causation may go the other way. 
Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2009) model firm productivity growth as the consequence 
of R&D expenditures with uncertain outcomes.  Estimating their model using a panel of Spanish 
firms, they find that R&D does appear to explain a substantial amount of productivity growth.  
However, and picking up the theme of increased variance tied to IT capital discussed above, they 
also find that firm-level uncertainty in the outcome of R&D is considerable, much more so than 
with respect to the return on physical capital investment.  In fact, their estimates suggest that 
engaging in R&D roughly doubles the degree of uncertainty in the evolution of a producer’s 
productivity level. 
Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2009) highlight the bidirectional causality between R&D and 
productivity in their study of Taiwanese electronics exporters.  They find that firms that select 
into exporting tend to already be more productive than their domestic counterparts (more on this 
in the trade section below), but the decision to export is often accompanied by large R&D 
investments.  These investments raise exporters’ productivity levels further in turn, highlighting 
both selection and causal effects tying productivity to R&D.  The timing of this R&D blitz is 
consistent with a world where the exporters are more willing to innovate on the margin because 
they can spread the potential gains of productivity growth across a larger market. 
Of course, R&D is simply one of the more observable components of firms’ overall 
innovative efforts.  Many firms undertake both process and product innovation without formally 
reporting R&D spending.  (I will discuss product innovation’s ties to productivity differences in 
further detail below.)  This limits the literature’s ability to give a comprehensive look into the 
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 relationships between productivity and innovation.  Still, it is a very useful start, and the 
mechanisms the R&D literature highlights are likely to often overlap with the effects of 
unmeasured innovative spending. 
 
3.4. Learning-by-doing 
The very act of operating can increase productivity.  Experience allows producers to 
identify opportunities for process improvements.  This productivity growth, often called 
learning-by-doing, has a long and rich history of study in the literature, but has recently been 
investigated in more detail given newly available micro-level production data. 
Benkard (2000) studies the precipitous drop in the labor hours Lockheed needed to 
assemble its L-1011 TriStar wide-body aircraft.  The first few units off the line required more 
than one million person hours (equivalent to three shifts a day of 2500 workers each for fifty 
work days).  This was cut in half by the 30
th plane, and halved again by the 100
th.  Benkard 
estimates both the learning rate—how fast past production increases productivity (decreases unit 
labor requirements)—and the “forgetting” rate, which is how fast the knowledge stock built by 
learning depreciates.  Forgetting is quantitatively important in this setting: Benkard estimates 
that almost 40 percent of the knowledge stock depreciates each year.  This may not be literal 
forgetting, but could instead primarily reflect labor turnover.  An additional factor in “forgetting” 
was the shift to a new variant of the plane after about 130 units.  This new variant was different 
enough that the imperfect substitutability of the knowledge stock between the original and new 
variants led to a temporary but substantial increase in labor requirements. 
Thornton and Thompson (2001) investigate what types of experience matter in 
productivity growth from learning by doing.  Their data includes unit labor requirements for 
several design variants of 4000 Liberty ships produced by multiple shipyards during World War 
II.  The multi-design/multi-yard nature of the data lets them estimate the relative productivity 
contributions of four different measures of past production experience: the yard’s past production 
experience with a particular design, the same yard’s past production of other designs, other 
yards’ experience with the particular design, and other yards’ production of other designs.  Not 
surprisingly, a yard’s past production of a particular model matters most for productivity growth 
in that same model.  After that comes the yard’s experience with other ship designs, at about 60 
percent the size of the own-design effect.  Cross-yard spillovers are considerably smaller—only 
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 about five to ten percent of the own-yard, own-design learning impact.  These cross-plant 
learning effects, while relatively modest here, do show that producers may become more 
productive by learning from other businesses.  I will discuss cross-business spillovers more 
below. 
In Levitt, List, and Syverson (2010), we find more limited cross-model learning 
spillovers within an auto assembly plant.  Using detailed data on hundreds of individual 
operations during assembly of thousands of cars, we studied the causes and effects of 
manufacturing defects.  This particular plant began production of three model variants 
(nameplates) of a common platform at staggered times during a production year.  Each time a 
new model ramped up, the plant began a new learning curve with defect rates roughly as high as 
during the previous model’s ramp-up.  There is some evidence, however, that learning happens 
faster for the later models: defect rates fall to their long-run level more quickly.  An interesting 
contrast was seen when looking at what happened to defect rates when a new shift started 
producing a given model.  In that case, re-learning was not necessary.  The new shift began 
operating at defect rates at about the same level as the previous shift had achieved after it already 
had run down much of the learning curve. 
Kellogg (2009) looks at oil and gas drilling in Texas to study how learning occurs when 
an upstream and downstream producer work together over time.  He follows the efforts of pairs 
of producers and drillers.  The former are companies actively involved in exploring for, 
extracting, and selling oil, while the latter firms specialize in boring out the wells that the 
producers hope will yield oil.  Since producers typically work with multiple drillers and vice 
versa, and work in different fields, Kellogg is able to separately measure the productivity impacts 
of the experience of producers alone (i.e., regardless of the drilling firms they work with), 
drillers alone, and the joint experience of producer-driller pairs.  He finds that accumulated 
experience between a producer-driller pair increases productivity above and beyond that of each 
of the firms’ overall experience levels.  This relationship-specific experience is a type of capital 
that is lost if the firms split up, giving them incentives to preserve their contracting environment. 
 
3.5. Product Innovation 
Innovations in product quality may not necessarily raise the quantity of output (measured 
in some physical unit) per unit input, but they can increase the product price and therefore the 
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 firm’s revenue per unit input.  If one thinks about productivity as units of quality delivered per 
unit input, product innovation can enhance productivity.  This is captured in standard revenue-
based productivity measures since they reflect price variations across an industry’s plants or 
firms.  (Though as mentioned above and discussed further below, revenue productivity can also 
be misleading when price variation due to differences in market power across producers exist.)  
Product innovation can be aimed at entering new markets, or at refocusing a firm’s efforts 
toward growing demand segments, as documented in Acemoglu and Linn (2004). 
Product innovation’s productivity effects have been studied in several recent papers.  As 
touched on above, one of the mechanisms behind IT-based productivity growth that Bartel, 
Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) point to is an improved ability to customize products.  Other inputs 
mentioned above, like R&D and higher-quality employees, can also spur innovation. 
Lentz and Mortensen (2008) use Danish firm-level data to estimate a model of firms’ 
product innovation efforts in the vertical-quality-ladder style of Klette and Kortum (2004).  They 
find that about 75 percent of aggregate productivity growth comes from reallocation of inputs 
(employment in their setup) to innovating firms.  About one-third of this comes from entry and 
exit channels.  The other two-thirds occurs as inputs move toward growing firms (and hence 
innovating firms, as seen through the lens of their model) from firms that lose market share when 
they fall behind the quality frontier. 
Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2009) link detailed and broad-based data on firms’ 
patenting and production activities (they merge the NBER patent database with the U.S. Census 
Business Register) to see what happens when a firm patents.  They find clear evidence that new 
patent grants are associated with increases in firm size (by any one of a number of measures), 
scope (the number of products it makes), and TFP (though the evidence is weaker here).  
Whether these correlations reflect the causal effects of patents is not clear; patenting activity 
could be just one part of a firm’s coordinated push into new markets.  Nevertheless, given the 
breadth of the study’s coverage and its result that correlations exist, more research in this area 
would be worthwhile. 
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (forthcoming) show that a firm’s TFP is positively 
correlated with the number of products it produces.  This holds both in the cross section and 
within firms over time.  At the very least, these results indicate that productivity growth 
accompanies expansion of the variety of products a firm offers.  It is less clear whether 
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 innovative activity drives both productivity and product-variety growth, or whether firms 
experiencing general productivity shocks “strike while the iron is hot,” expanding their product 
offerings in response.  The role of changes in product scope in firm size and productivity growth 
is one that is just beginning to get the attention it deserves in research agendas. 
  
3.6. Firm Structure Decisions 
A lot of the micro productivity literature uses the establishment (e.g., factory, store, or 
office) as the unit of analysis.  This is in part data driven; many surveys are conducted at this 
level.  Plus, plants often embody the smallest indivisible unit of a production process, and as 
such are a natural level at which to study technologies.  But it is also clear that firm-level factors, 
and in particular, the organizational structure of the firm’s production units—the industries they 
operate in, their vertical and horizontal linkages, their relative sizes, and so on—will sometimes 
be related to the productivity levels of the firm’s component business units. 
Some have suggested there is a link between firm decentralization and how easily 
productive new technologies are adopted.  Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009b) favor this 
explanation for European firms’ recent laggard productivity growth (as mentioned above).  It is 
also the subject of Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007).  The evidence 
tends to be suggestive but indirect, however, and this is an area where careful work in measuring 
firm structures (not an easy task) could pay big dividends. 
Forbes and Lederman (2009) look at how vertical integration affects airline performance.  
They find that, among flights departing from a given airport on a given day, airlines that own 
their regional affiliates experience shorter delays and fewer cancellations than those contracting 
with affiliated regionals at arms’ length.  This performance advantage appears to come largely 
from differential performance on adverse weather days.  Forbes and Lederman posit that 
contracts are limited in their ability fully specify contingent actions necessary to react most 
effectively to short-horizon logistical problems.  Vertical integration, by clearly setting out the 
decision rights within the organization, allows airlines to more nimbly respond to unexpected 
scheduling issues.  This flexibility comes at a cost, however: primarily in higher wage costs for 
integrated airlines.  This could explain why not every mainline carrier has integrated. 
  Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) use the Longitudinal Business Database, which contains 
most private non-agricultural establishments in the U.S., to examine the productivity of plants in 
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 vertically structured firms.  We find that vertically integrated plants have higher productivity 
levels than their non-integrated industry cohorts, but most of this difference reflects selection of 
high-productivity plants into vertical structures rather than a causal impact of integration on 
productivity.  Surprisingly, these productivity differences—and indeed the firm’s choice to have 
a vertical structure at all—usually not related to the movements of goods along the production 
chain.  Vertically integrated firms’ upstream plants ship a surprisingly small amount to 
downstream plants in their firm (small relative to both the firms’ total upstream production and 
their downstream needs).  Roughly one-third of upstream plants report no shipments to their 
firms’ downstream units; half ship less than three percent of their output internally.  This 
suggests that rather than moderating goods transfers along production chains, integration instead 
allows more efficient transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within the firm. 
  Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and Schoar (2002) both investigate the productivity of 
plants within conglomerate firms (in their setting, those that operate in multiple two- or three-
digit SIC industries).  Their work was spurred on in part by the extensive finance literature on the 
“diversification discount,” the term for the oft-measured negative correlation between a firm’s 
financial returns and the number of business lines it operates.  Both papers leverage U.S. 
manufacturer microdata to convincingly argue that the diversification discount is not about low 
productivity (or even, in one case, any sort of underperformance).  They differ, however, in their 
explanations. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) make a selection argument.  Firms that choose to 
specialize are likely to have idiosyncratically high productivity draws in a particular line of 
business, but considerably weaker draws outside this segment.  Firms that choose conglomerate 
structures, on the other hand, are likely to have high draws in several industries, but not 
exceptionally high draws in any particular industry.  Thus if one simply compares the 
performance of a conglomerate’s segments to the focused and highly productive segments of a 
specialist, the latter would expectedly be higher.  This result does not rely on the previous 
literature’s favored explanations of management overreach, cross subsidization of weak 
segments, or other agency problems at conglomerates.  It simply reflects the optimal allocation 
of resources within a business given the firm’s inherent abilities.  They support their efficient 
allocation argument by showing that conglomerate firms’ most productive plants are in their 
largest segments, and segments of a given rank are more productive in larger firms.  
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 Furthermore, conglomerates expand on their strongest margins: their largest, most productive 
segments are more sensitive to demand shifts than their smaller, less efficient lines of business. 
Schoar (2002) notes that in her sample, plants in conglomerates have, if anything, higher 
permanent productivity levels.  The observed discount reflects the temporary adjustment costs 
resulting from the very act of diversifying into new businesses.  She shows that when a 
conglomerate diversifies, the plants it buys actually experience productivity growth, suggesting 
that they are in fact being reallocated to more capable management (there will be more on the 
reallocation of productive inputs below).  At the same time, however, the conglomerate’s 
existing plants suffer productivity losses.  Since conglomerates have on average many more 
existing plants than acquired ones, average productivity in the firm falls for a period.  Schoar 
attributes these productivity changes to a “new toy” effect: managers (over-) concentrate their 
efforts on integrating the new plants and business lines at the expense of existing ones.  She also 
finds evidence that the firms’ wages absorb any performance rents, also leading to a bifurcation 
between performance as measured by productivity and by stock market returns. 
 
4. External Drivers of Productivity Differences 
The previous section discussed factors that operate within the firm to determine 
productivity levels.  Producers have, at least in theory, some degree of control over these factors.  
This section focuses instead on how producers’ operating environments can influence 
productivity levels and growth.  These environmental factors may not operate directly on 
productivity, but they can affect producers’ incentives to apply the factors discussed in the 
previous section.  They can also influence the extent to which such efforts are successful at 
moving producers to a higher position within their industry’s productivity distribution, and 
responsive market share and survival are to productivity differences.  That is, these external 
drivers can impact both the so-called “within” and “between” components of aggregate 
productivity growth.  The within component comes from individual producers becoming more 
efficient.  The between component arises when more efficient producers grow faster than less 
efficient ones, or when more efficient entrants replace less efficient exiting businesses.
12 
                                                 
12 Many studies attempt to quantify the relative contributions of within and between effects by decomposing 
aggregate productivity growth into terms that reflect the separate effects.  Petrin and Levinsohn (2008) have recently 
raised caveats about the robustness of these commonly used “accounting decompositions.”  They advocate a method 
that focuses on measuring the gaps between the estimated social marginal benefits and costs of producers’ inputs.  
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 By their nature, these environmental elements are also the most closely tied to 
government policy.  Therefore understanding these drivers merits special attention when 
considering the productivity implications of market interventions. 
Before discussing the specific external drivers, it is worth taking a minute to discuss why 
the operating environment should affect observed productivity levels.  The most basic producer 
theory, after all, says any profit-minimizing firm minimizes its cost of producing its chosen 
quantity.  This prediction is invariant to the structure of the market in which the firm operates. 
The presence of spillovers is one possible channel through which the external 
environment affects productivity levels.  I discuss situations where other firms’ production 
practices influence another business’s productivity level first in this section. 
A second possibility is that external drivers influence the extent of Darwinian selection in 
the firm’s market.  This force is highlighted by the model in Section 2.  Environmental factors 
that shift the model’s exogenous parameters or the shape of the revenue function will change the 
minimum productivity level necessary for profitable operation, A, and the responsiveness of 
market share to productivity differences.  This will shift the observed productivity distribution 
among the market’s producers. 
Even in the absence of spillovers or selection, external factors can affect producers’ 
incentives to raise their own productivity level.  How can this be if theory says firms minimize 
costs?  Well, the standard, static cost-minimizing firm model is an inadequate description of the 
technology adoption processes.  A richer model like that in Holmes, Levine, and Schmitz 
(2008)—who build off Arrow’s (1962) seminal work—points out additional channels through 
which a firm’s market environment (and the competitive structure in particular) shifts producers’ 
incentives to raise their productivity level.  Holmes et al. suppose that adopting a productivity-
enhancing practice involves disruption costs: a temporary period where costs are actually higher 
than before any technological change was made.  Disruption could be due to installation issues, 
fine-tuning new technology, retraining workers, and so on.  With such adoption costs, producers 
facing less competition have less incentive to adopt the new technology, because the higher per-
unit profits that monopoly power brings raise the opportunity cost of changing production 
                                                                                                                                                             
Aggregate productivity grows when inputs are reallocated in a way that reduces the average gap.  While distinct in 
theory and empirical implementation from the accounting decompositions, such “gap methods” have the same 
conceptual goal: to separately measure how much aggregate productivity growth comes from businesses becoming 
more efficient themselves and how much comes from reallocation of economic activity to more efficient producers. 
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 practices.  In the context of the model in Section 2, less competition means a more concave 
revenue function due to steeper residual demand curves.  This could arise from, for example, less 
scope for consumers to substitute across producers in the output market.
13 
The reality of production is also much more complex than even in these augmented 
models.  Most technologies, even if routinized, are intricate, multifaceted processes that require 
considerable coordination.  They are constantly being buffeted by shocks to input costs and 
demand-driven shifts in capacity requirements.  Cost-minimizing production practice is really 
therefore a moving target, a constantly shifting ideal combination of operations.  Elements of a 
firm’s market environment can affect the firm’s incentives to chase that moving target. 
 
4.1. Productivity Spillovers 
Producer practices can have spillover effects on the productivity levels of others.  These 
externalities are often discussed in the context of classic agglomeration mechanisms like thick-
input-market effects and knowledge transfers.  Knowledge transfers in particular need not be tied 
to any single geographic or input market.  Producers are likely to attempt to emulate productivity 
leaders in their own and closely related industries, regardless of whether they share a common 
input market. 
Any empirical search for spillovers must face the classic “reflection problem” familiar to 
the peer effects literature: correlated productivity levels among cohorts of producers can be a 
sign of spillovers, but the correlation might also reflect the impact of common shocks from 
unobserved third factors.  Obviously, if one can observe exogenous productivity shocks for a 
subset of producers and track how related producers’ productivity levels evolve in response, this 
goes a great way towards identifying causality.  Such instances can be difficult to observe 
generally, however, and such an approach cannot be used in a single cross section.  An 
alternative strategy is to test whether the intensity of the productivity correlation is related to 
some measure of between-producer distance, be it in geographic, technological, or product-
market space.  Higher productivity correlations among “nearby” producers are predicted by 
                                                 
13 A second, more roundabout mechanism also relates greater competition to technology innovation and adoption.  If 
heightened competition raises the firm’s probability of exit or bankruptcy, the convexity of the firm’s payoffs 
created by limited liability encourages risk-taking (see, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1991)).  In essence, 
competition may drive desperate firms to “throw a Hail Mary” by adopting risky but potentially productive new 
technologies in the hope of staving off collapse.  I will discuss another implication of the convexity of firm payoffs 
and technology adoption below. 
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 many theories of spillovers.  This approach is still imperfect, however, as the structure of 
common shocks might also be related to distance. 
Moretti (2004) explores agglomeration-type productivity spillovers by matching the 1980 
and 1990 U.S. Population Censuses with the 1982 and 1992 Census of Manufactures by city-
industry.  He estimates a plant-level production function that includes the share of workers in 
other industries in the metro area who have completed some college.  He interprets the estimated 
marginal product of this outside educated labor as a productivity spillover.  Moretti finds that the 
marginal product of the local human capital measure is in fact positive.  Furthermore, the 
measured spillovers are stronger across plants that are “close” in both the geographic and 
technological senses.  These results are consistent with both the thick-input-market and 
knowledge-transfer stories of productivity spillovers. 
Several studies have focused specifically on the role of knowledge transfers.  On one 
level, it seems that they must exist.  It is doubtful that productivity-enhancing practices are 
completely excludable; businesses cannot always keep every facet of their production process 
secret.  On the other hand, the ubiquity of large and persistent productivity differences within 
industries suggests that any such emulation/spillover process is far from perfect.  Frictions 
clearly exist that prevent less efficient producers from fully replicating industry leaders’ best 
practices.  The crucial research questions of these studies, then, are the size of knowledge 
transfers, what features influence this size, and the channels through which the spillovers 
operate. 
Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen (2007) show that the geographic location of a firm’s 
R&D activity matters.  Using patent data to pin down the historical locations of U.K. firms’ 
R&D operations (they use pre-sample locations to minimize endogeneity of the location of 
research activity), they find that U.K. firms with a greater R&D presence in the U.S. have faster 
overall productivity growth, and that this growth is more highly correlated with average U.S. 
productivity growth.  These patterns are consistent with a U.S. research presence making it easier 
for firms to tap into the knowledge base of the U.S. economy, which tends to be at the 
technological lead of most industries.  The precise mechanism through which this technology 
tapping occurs is unclear, and would be an interesting area for further exploration. 
Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2007) point out that spillovers can cut two ways: 
technological spillovers can benefit everyone, but there can also be market-stealing effects on the 
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 product market side.  They separately identify these two effects by comparing the impact of 
firms’ R&D (instrumented for using federal- and state-level R&D tax incentives) on other firms 
at varying technological and product market distances.  They measure technological distance 
using correlations in firms’ patenting patterns and product market distance using the correlation 
in firms’ sales across business segments.  Because these two distances are not perfectly 
correlated across firms, they can measure the separate impacts of R&D.  They find that both 
types of spillovers matter, but technological spillovers quantitatively dominate, creating a net 
positive externality. 
Bartelsman, Haskel, and Martin (2008) make an interesting distinction between global 
and economy-specific technology frontiers.  They show using microdata from numerous 
countries that a plant’s productivity converges faster toward the productivity level of the 
domestic leader in its industry than the global industry leader.  A second intriguing result is that 
if a plant falls sufficiently behind the global frontier, any pull toward convergence disappears, 
but convergence to the national frontier remains no matter the size of the gap (conditional on 
survival, of course). 
Crespi et al. (2008) and Keller and Yeaple (2009) also look at cross-border productivity 
convergence.  Crespi et al. focus on measuring the information flows that could be the source of 
this convergence.  They combine production microdata with survey data on where firms gather 
information used in their innovative efforts.  They find that, not surprisingly, “nearby” firms 
(e.g., suppliers and competitors, though less so buyers) are primary sources; that much of this 
information, particularly from competitors, is free (though surely not given freely); and that 
having a multinational presence aids these flows.  Keller and Yeaple (2009) tie productivity 
growth among publicly traded U.S. firms to foreign direct investment in those firms sectors by 
foreign-owned multinationals.  FDI-driven spillovers account for a substantial portion of 
productivity growth, especially in high-tech sectors. 
  These papers and others like them suggest that spillovers exist and operate through 
various mechanisms, though again the observed productivity dispersion also makes clear that 
substantial frictions to the diffusion and replication of best practices remain.  Policies meant to 
increase such spillovers must be careful, however, to not destroy firms’ incentives to innovate.  If 
spillover-enhancing policies make it too hard for firms to appropriate the benefits of their 




Pressures from threatened or actual competitors can affect productivity levels within an 
industry.  Competition drives productivity through two key mechanisms; this section discusses 
examples of research into both. 
The first is Darwinian selection among producers with heterogeneous productivity levels.  
Competition moves market share toward more efficient (i.e., lower-cost and generally therefore 
lower-price) producers, shrinking relatively high-cost firms/plants, sometimes forcing their exit, 
and opening up room for more efficient producers.  It also raises the productivity bar that any 
potential entrant must meet to successfully enter.  In the static model of Section 2, these 
mechanisms are summarized as an increase in A.  Such selection underlies the “between” 
component of aggregate productivity growth mentioned earlier. 
The second mechanism acts through efficiency increases within plants or firms.  As 
discussed above, heightened competition can induce firms to take costly productivity-raising 
actions that they may otherwise not.  Besides raising producers’ own productivity levels, this 
effect of competition leads to aggregate productivity growth via the “within” component.  There 
is a Schumpeterian caveat to this within-effect of competition, however.  As Vives (2007) points 
out, under certain conditions, heightened competition (at least for a market of fixed size) can 
actually diminish a firm’s incentives to make productivity-enhancing investments. 
Because of the substantial literature built around the productivity impacts of trade 
competition, I discuss it in a separate subsection below.  I first cover general competitive effects. 
 
4.2.1. Intra-market Competition 
A general indicator that product-market competition is enhancing productivity is a 
positive correlation between productivity and producer growth and survival.  Such correlations 
have been a robust finding in the literature; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) offer a 
broad-based overview, for example.
14  Several recent studies have looked at particular 
mechanisms through which competition leads to a Darwinian selection process. 
                                                 
14 Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) point out that these results linking selection to productivity actually 
reflect selection on profitability, since intra-industry price variation caused by idiosyncratic demand differences 
across plants is buried in standard revenue-based productivity measures.  They show that such demand variation is 
extremely important in explaining plant survival patterns, even in their sample of plants in homogeneous-product 
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 Syverson (2004b) investigates the connection between competition and productivity in a 
case study of the ready-mixed concrete industry, which is well suited for this type of 
investigation.  The industry’s physically homogeneous product and very high transport costs 
make spatial differentiation paramount.  Differences in competitiveness across markets should 
therefore be related to the density of concrete producers in the market.  It is harder for inefficient 
concrete producers to be profitable in dense markets, because if they charge the high prices 
necessary to cover their costs, customers can easily shift to their more efficient competitors.  
This implies the productivity distribution of ready-mixed plants will be truncated from below as 
density rises.  This is indeed what holds in the data.  Markets with denser construction activity 
have higher lower-bound productivity levels, higher average productivity, and less productivity 
dispersion.  (Construction density is used as an exogenous shifter of concrete producer density 
because the construction sector buys almost all of the ready-mixed industry’s output, yet 
concrete accounts for only a small share of construction costs.)  In Syverson (2007) I show that 
these patterns of competition-driven selection on costs are also reflected in ready-mixed prices.
15 
  Outside of manufacturing, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) find that aggregate 
productivity growth in the U.S. retail sector is almost exclusively through the exit of less 
efficient single-store firms and by their replacement with more efficient national chain store 
affiliates.  This evokes stories surrounding the growth and competitive impacts of discount 
retailers like Wal-Mart and Target over the past two decades. 
These studies focus on the selection effect of competition.  Schmitz (2005) offers an 
example of productivity growth in an industry that is driven almost entirely by within-effect 
efficiency improvements.  He follows U.S. iron ore mining during the period the industry was 
first facing competition from foreign producers.  (Brazilian mines, specifically.  We will discuss 
more examples of trade-induced productivity change in a separate section below.)  The case 
study shows how competition can drive existing firms to improve their productivity. 
The U.S. iron ore industry had been protected from foreign competition by the high costs 
of transporting ore from its other sources on the globe (e.g., Australia and Brazil).  By 1980, 
                                                                                                                                                             
industries.  This broader interpretation of the evidence to include demand-side factors will be discussed further in 
the following section.   
15 Such price effects also raise an interesting point given the common use of revenue-based productivity measures.  
Namely, as competition raises the average physical (i.e., quantity-, not revenue-based) productivity level in the 
market, it also reduces prices.  This means standard revenue-based productivity measures will understate the true 
impact of competition on average productivity levels. 
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 however, increased production from low-cost Brazilian mines brought delivered prices for 
Brazilian ore in the Great Lakes region in line with delivered prices from northern Minnesota’s 
Mesabi Range, the major ore-producing area of the U.S.  Facing competition from abroad for the 
first time, the U.S. producers attempted to lower costs by making drastic changes in their 
production operations.  Schmitz shows most of these changes centered on loosening the strict 
work rules in the U.S. mines.  For instance, mine managers originally had very little flexibility in 
their ability to assign different workers to different tasks.  The initiation of serious competition 
allowed the mines to gain back flexibility in new contacts, raising their utilization of available 
labor and enabling them to shed unneeded overhead workers.  The reconfigured contracts were 
extremely successful at raising productivity.  The industry’s average labor productivity had been 
roughly constant at two tons of ore per worker-hour for several decades preceding 1980.  By 
1985, however, it had doubled to four tons per hour.  As a result, the mines were able to remain 
competitive even in the face of continuing falling Brazilian ore prices. 
Other recent studies have shown these detailed case studies appear emblematic of much 
broader competitive effects that act across numerous industries and economies.  For example, 
Syverson (2004a) looks at the entire U.S. manufacturing sector.  Disney, Haskel, and Heden 
(2003a and 2003b) and the studies described in UK Office of Fair Trading (2007) show similar 
results in the U.K.  And Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) overview evidence across OECD 
countries. 
 
4.2.2. Trade Competition 
As seen in Schmitz’s results for the iron ore industry, the presence—or even just the 
threat—of imports from abroad is another form of competitive pressure.  This phenomenon is the 
focus of a burgeoning line of research, driven in part by the recent theoretical trade literature 
focusing on heterogeneous-productivity producers and their response to trade, especially Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). 
  Pavcnik (2002) shows how trade liberalization during the 1970s drove productivity 
growth among Chilean manufacturers.  The paper demonstrates that sectors facing new import 
competition saw faster productivity growth over her 1979-86 sample period than sectors 
producing primarily non-tradables.  Pavcnik goes on to show that these industry-level gains came 
both from existing producers raising their productivity levels (the within effect) and from the 
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 reallocation of activity away from—and sometimes, the exit of—less efficient, formerly 
protected producers (the selection effect). 
  Multiple studies using producer microdata have since found comparable results in other 
settings.  Examples include Eslava et al. (2004); Muendler (2004); Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
(2006); Fernandes (2007); and Verhoogen (2008).  The specific mechanisms through which 
trade-oriented competition is postulated to increase productivity do vary across the papers, from 
quality upgrading within plants to heighted selection across plants.  Amiti and Konings (2007) 
highlight a separate mechanism through which trade can increase productivity: the expansion of 
the set (or declines in the effective price) of intermediate inputs when imported inputs become 
more available.  I will discuss the input-market channel further below. 
Interestingly, despite the strong correlation between the average productivity level of an 
industry’s plants and that industry’s trade exposure, there is less evidence of large productivity 
impacts on the domestic plants when they begin exporting.  That is, exporters are almost 
inevitably more productive than their non-exporting industry counterparts, but most studies have 
found that this correlation largely reflects selection rather than a causal impact of exporting on 
productivity.  Plants that choose to begin exporting were already more productive before trade.  
This is surprising if only because exporting firms can leverage the benefits of any productivity 
gains across larger markets, raising their incentive to engage in innovative activities. 
That said, Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker (2007) document cases where 
exporters’ productivity advantage grows after entry into the export market.  (This is sometimes 
referred to as the “learning-by-exporting” hypothesis.)  Both are in somewhat special settings, 
which might explain in part why they find post-export productivity growth while many others 
have not.  The post-export growth of Van Biesebroeck’s (2005) sample of Subsaharan African 
exporters appears to reduce their credit and contract enforcement constraints, allowing them to 
undertake what were previously prohibitively costly productivity-raising activities.  Such a 
mechanism raises the question of whether it would apply to any firm that chooses to export (if 
so, why wouldn’t every producer do so?), or whether these effects, while causal, reflect 
heterogeneous treatment effects, with firms most apt to benefit choosing to export.  De Loecker 
(2007) finds that Slovenian firms that begin exporting during the post-transition period saw 
productivity growth after entering foreign markets.  Interestingly, firms exporting to higher-
income regions saw greater productivity growth.  Apparently the export market—not just the 
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 exporter itself—matters.  This raises interesting selection issues about which markets firms 
choose to export to, even conditional on the decision to export in the first place. 
 
4.3. Deregulation or Proper Regulation. 
Poorly regulated markets can create perverse incentives that reduce productivity.  
Deregulating or reformatting to smarter forms of regulation can reverse this. 
Bridgman, Qi, and Schmitz (2009) show how regulations in place for decades in the U.S. 
sugar market destroyed incentives to raise productivity.  The U.S. Sugar Act, passed in 1934 as 
part of the Depression-era restructuring of agricultural law, funded a subsidy to sugar beet 
farmers with a tax on downstream sugar refining.  Refiners were compensated for this tax by 
quota protection from imports and government-imposed limits on domestic competition (antitrust 
law was often thrown to the wind in the construction of New Deal programs).  This transfer 
scheme led to the standard quantity distortions, but it also distorted incentives for efficient 
production.  Farmers received a flat payment per ton of sugar contained in their beets, so their 
optimal response was to simply grow the largest beets possible.  The problem is that larger beets 
have a lower sugar-to-pulp ratio, requiring more time and energy to refine a given amount of 
sugar from them.  At the same time, given the restraints on competition in the refined sugar 
market, refiners had little incentive to improve sugar extraction on the margin.  The combined 
result of these incentives is readily apparent in the data.  When the Sugar Act was passed, a ton 
of beets yielded an average of 310 pounds of refined sugar, a figure that had been steadily rising 
from 215 pounds per ton in 1900.  But this trend suddenly reversed after 1934.  Yields dropped 
to 280 pounds per ton by 1950 and 240 pounds by 1974, the year the Act was repealed.  Not 
surprisingly, yields began to climb again immediately after repeal, to about 295 pounds per ton 
by 2004.  It is a sad testimony to the Act’s productivity distortions that yields 70 years after the 
act were still lower than when it was passed. 
Knittel (2002) and Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007) examine how power plant 
operations react to changes in the regulatory structure they operate under.  Both studies involve 
moving plants away from a traditional cost-plus regulated monopoly structure into alternative 
forms.  Knittel (2002) studies the implementation of “incentive regulation” programs, where 
regulators explicitly tie operators’ earnings to the achievement of particular operating 
efficiencies.  Fabrizio et al. look the effect of electricity market reforms that occurred in many 
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 regions in the U.S. during the 1990s.  Both studies find that plants experienced efficiency gains 
after the shift in the regulatory environment.  Fabrizio et al. also show that, in line with what one 
would expect, the productivity gains were largest among investor-owned utilities and smallest in 
municipally-operated utilities. 
Beyond these case studies, recent work has also taken a broader look at how product 
market regulations impact productivity at the micro level.  For example, Greenstone, List, and 
Syverson (2009) show how environmental regulations (the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments 
specifically) reduce manufacturing plants’ productivity levels.  Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) 
and Arnold, Nicoletti, and Scarpetta (2008) discuss the productivity effects of product-market 
regulations in OECD economies.  A related yet distinct relation between legal structure and 
productivity is how privatization affects formerly state owned firms.  Brown, Earle, and 
Telegdy’s (2006) study of formerly state owned enterprises in several Eastern European 
countries is one of the more comprehensive of such studies.  They document broad-based 
productivity growth in plants after privatization, but they also find considerable variation in the 
size of the impacts across countries, with more than 15 percent average TFP growth in Romania, 
but a slightly negative impact in Russia. 
 
4.4. Flexible Input Markets 
I discussed above how competition increases productivity.  If one thinks of competition 
as flexibility in product markets—in more competitive markets, it’s easier for consumers to shift 
their purchases from one producer to another—it is logical to suppose that flexible input markets 
might also raise productivity levels. 
Indeed, there are almost surely complementarities between product market and input 
market flexibility.  If consumers want to reallocate their purchases across producers, firms that 
experience growth in demand for their products will need to hire additional inputs to meet that 
demand.  The more easily inputs can move toward these firms, which will typically be higher-
productivity businesses due to the forces described above, the faster and more smoothly the 
reallocation mechanism works.  In the context of the model in Section 2, flexible input markets 
reduce the concavity of the revenue function, making producer size more responsive to 
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 productivity differences.  This section discusses recent research tying factor market flexibility to 
productivity.
16 
  Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) investigate the market for U.S. manufacturing plants 
themselves, as productive assets.  They measure how a plant’s productivity changes when it is 
sold by one firm to another.  They find that, on average, a plant’s productivity rises after the sale.  
That is reassuring: the market tends to allocate inputs in an efficient way, instead of as a response 
to ambitions of empire-building managers or other inefficient motives.  Another of their findings 
that is consistent with this efficiency-enhancing role is that the plants that are sold tend to come 
from the selling firm’s less productive business lines.  In essence, the sellers are moving away 
from activities at which they are less proficient. 
Petrin and Sivadasan (2006) use a novel approach to look at the productivity effects of 
labor market flexibility.  They measure the difference between Chilean plants’ marginal products 
of labor (as derived from industry-level production functions they estimate) and their average 
wages.  Such gaps can be caused by any one of a number of market distortions, like market 
power, taxes, or the firing costs that are the object of the study.  Allocative efficiency is 
achieved, at least in the cross section, when this gap is equated across plants.  (Though of course 
overall inefficiencies still exist unless these gaps are all zero.)  Efficiency increases if labor 
inputs are moved from low- to high-gap plants, because the net change in marginal product 
caused by the input shift outstrips the change in wage costs.  Petrin and Sivadasan find that a 
particular legislative change that raised firing costs was associated with an increase in the mean 
gap, suggesting the legislation reduced allocative efficiency. 
  Several recent papers have taken these ideas and asked whether, more broadly speaking, 
economies efficiently allocate inputs across heterogeneous production units.  Hsieh and Klenow 
(2009) use the measured TFP dispersion across Chinese and Indian firms to infer the size of 
producer-level distortions that jointly depress aggregate productivity in those economies.  Their 
methodology is conceptually similar to Petrin and Sivadasan’s gap approach.  Their model 
indicates that in the absence of distortions, plants’ revenue-based TFP levels (TFP measured 
using revenues as an output measure rather than quantities) should be equal.  This implies that 
                                                 
16 The institutional features of input markets, like the roles of unions and the structure of the financial sector, have 
an ambiguous theoretical impact on flexibility.  If institutions improve match efficiency, solve asymmetric 
information problems, or otherwise serve efficiency-enhancing roles, they make input markets more flexible.  If they 
facilitate rent-seeking behavior on the other hand, they impede flexibility.  In the end, the impact of any particular 
institution is an empirical question—one which several of the studies in this section investigate. 
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 observed deviations from this equality reflect the presence of distortions.  (Note, however, that 
quantity-based TFP values are not equated even if there are no distortions.)  Essentially, their 
framework implies that plants with relatively high (low) revenue TFP levels are too small (large) 
relative to an allocatively efficient benchmark.
17  After measuring these implied plant-level 
distortions, they compare their distribution to the analogous distribution measured in U.S. 
microdata.  (This is used as the comparison rather than the first-best/zero-distortion outcomes 
because it is a more realistic control group.  The U.S. data contain, and hence can be used to 
control for, gaps that reflect adjustment costs and measurement error that may be immutable to 
policy action.)  Hsieh and Klenow find that Chinese aggregate TFP could increase by 30-50 
percent and Indian TFP by 40-60 percent by achieving the U.S. level of allocative efficiency 
with their existing resources. 
 Bartelsma 
n, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2009) look at the success of allocation across several countries.  
Rather than using a gap-type methodology like Hsieh and Klenow, they measure efficiency using 
the correlation between a plant’s share of industry output and its productivity level.  The logic of 
this metric is straightforward and similar to that in the model in Section 2 and what was 
discussed at the beginning of the competition section.  Well functioning markets should 
reallocate output to more productive plants, leading to a positive correlation between output 
share and productivity.  An additional advantage of the metric is that it is easy to compute.  Its 
limitation is that it is an accounting decomposition, and as such is not directly tied to welfare 
theory the way gap-type measures are.  However, Bartelsman et al. show in a simple model how 
various types of producer-level distortions do in fact lead to reductions in the output-productivity 
correlation within an industry. 
 
5. Big Questions 
That is a brief summary of what we know about the causes of productivity differences at 
the micro level, and why we would want to know these causes.  I want to emphasize that while 
                                                 
17 Their model’s implication of equal revenue TFP across plants stems from the standard efficiency condition that 
inputs’ marginal revenue products are equated across all uses, and the fact that marginal products are proportional to 
average products for a Cobb-Douglas production function without fixed costs.  Since TFP is an average product 
measure, equal marginal revenue products implies equal average revenue products and therefore equal revenue TFP.  
Non-Cobb-Douglas technologies and/or fixed costs can also support persistent revenue TFP differences aside from 
any distortions. 
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 the discussion draws out major themes of that body of knowledge, it really only just scratches the 
surface of the literature. 
I think a fair reading of the discussion above would say that we have learned a lot about 
productivity since the Bartelsman and Doms (2000) survey.  At the same time, it is hardly time 
to declare victory and go home.  Many pressing issues and open questions remain.  In this 
section, I will briefly lay out what I see to be the major questions about productivity that the 
research agenda should address.
18 
 
What is the importance of demand?  Productivity is typically thought of as a supply-side concept.  
As discussed in Section 2, it is the component of the production function unrelated to observable 
labor, capital, and intermediate inputs.  But productivity as actually measured in producer 
microdata generally reflects more than just supply-side forces.  Because producer-specific prices 
are unobserved in most business-level microdata, output is typically measured by revenue 
divided by an industry-level deflator.  This means that within-industry price differences are 
embodied in output and productivity measures.  If prices reflect in part idiosyncratic demand 
shifts or market power variation across producers—a distinct likelihood in many industries—
then high “productivity” businesses may not be particularly technologically efficient.  Much of 
the literature described above therefore documents the joint influence of productivity and 
demand factors that show up in within-industry price variation. 
  A new strand of research has begun to extend the productivity literature to explicitly 
account for such idiosyncratic demand effects as well.  These new frameworks—see Das, 
Roberts, and Tybout (2007); Eslava et al. (2008); Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008, 
2009), and De Loecker (2009), for example—allow an additional and realistic richness in the 
market forces that determine producers’ fates.  The work to this point indicates that demand 
factors are indeed important.  They exert a considerable influence on businesses’ growth and 
survival.  And while many of the basic results above that have been checked after adjusting for 
the supply-demand dichotomy have been robust, the results do suggest some reinterpretations of 
productivity effects as inferred from standard measures. 
The scope of issues that this new line of research has addressed is still small, however.  
Demand could play an important role in many more settings that have been hidden to this point 
                                                 
18 Conversations with John Haltiwanger were very helpful in writing this section. 
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 due to measurement issues.  This is likely to be especially true when moving to sectors without 
well defined outputs (what exactly does Google produce, for example, and how should it be 
measured?).  Unwinding this knot is a top priority. 
  
What is the role of (or hope for) government policies that encourage productivity growth?  
Clearly, many of the productivity drivers discussed above can be influenced by government 
policies.  This is especially true of the “external” drivers in the previous section—the elements of 
the market environment that can induce business to take actions to raise their productivity or that 
affect the Darwinian selection process that whittles out inefficient producers. 
  Several policy-related questions are prime targets for research.  There have been many 
policy reforms (particularly in trade policy and market regulation design) that had plausibly 
productivity-enhancing effects.  Many studies have evaluated specific reforms in isolation, 
taking the policy change as given.  But a policy change, even one that moves in the right 
direction, may not necessarily be optimal.  Alternative reforms, either in size or approach, might 
be more cost effective.  Research has typically compared the effects of policy reforms to a null of 
no reform, but perhaps an equally important comparison is among possible reform alternatives.  
What type of reform is most effective for a given type of market or friction?  What is the optimal 
size and timing of policy changes?  These are the next set of questions the literature should chase 
in this area. 
  A related issue is why reforms, even if they are welfare enhancing in their productivity 
effects, don’t always happen.  There could be economic reasons for this.  Established interests 
could be earning rents in the unreformed environment.  They may be able to stave off reform, 
especially if its benefits are diffuse while its losses are concentrated.  Characterizing the nature 
of these barriers to aggregate productivity gains—who wins, who loses, and by how much—
could be fruitful. 
 
Which productivity drivers matter most?  The research described above has framed which factors 
might explain variation in productivity levels.  The relative quantitative importance of each, 
however, is still unclear.  Summarized succinctly, if we could easily measure these factors and 
add them to the production function, which would have the largest R
2? 
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   Of course, it’s quite likely that the quantitative impact of factors varies across industries 
or markets.  A concomitant question, then, is which factors matter most in what sectors?  
Research that ties observable attributes of the industry’s technology or demand structure to the 
quantitative importance of productivity-influencing factors would be an incredible advance in 
our ability to explain productivity growth. 
  
What factors determine whether selection or within-producer growth is more important in a 
market/sector/industry?  In many settings above, there was a prominent distinction between 
aggregate productivity growth coming from “within” (productivity growth at a given plant or 
firm) and “between” (reallocation-based selection across existing businesses or entry and exit) 
sources.  Just as the literature still needs to characterize the relative quantitative contribution of 
various influences on producer-level efficiency, so too does it need to measure the relative 
importance of within and between components in explaining aggregate productivity growth. 
  We do know some patterns already.  For example, aggregate productivity growth in the 
retail sector seems to be almost exclusively from reallocation, at least in the U.S.  But of course 
the literature has covered nowhere near the full span of sectors and economies.  More 
importantly, we do not yet have a good model of what sectoral features (again on either the 
supply or demand side) might determine the relative importance of each.  Why is within-store 
productivity growth so small on average in retail, but not manufacturing, for example?  
Answering questions like this would go a long way to developing our understanding of how 
micro productivity differences drive the aggregate productivity movements. 
 
What is the role of misallocation as a source of variation in emerging economies? Productivity 
differences explain much of the per capita income variation across countries.  As seen above, 
recent research with producer microdata is building the case that a substantial portion of these 
productivity gaps arise from poor allocation of inputs across production units in developing 
countries. 
  In some ways, this is a hopeful finding: these countries could become substantially more 
productive (and raise their incomes) by simply rearranging the inputs they already have.  Not 
everything hangs on some unattainable technologies that are out of reach. 
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   On the other hand, the result also has discouraging elements.  While research has 
identified misallocation as a source of the problem, it hasn’t really pinned down exactly what 
distortions create gaps between the social marginal benefits and costs of inputs across production 
units.  It is hard to implement policies that close these gaps and the variation between them (i.e., 
reallocate inputs more efficiently) without knowing the nature of the gaps in the first place. 
  That said, there has been some early progress on this front.  Witness the efforts to tie 
misallocation to various labor market policies.  Much remains to be done, however, and this is an 
important area for further effort. 
 
What is the importance of higher variance in productivity outcomes?  Some of the work above, 
particularly that focusing on the role of IT capital, suggests that the variance of productivity 
outcomes might be increasing at a very broad level.  This has several implications.  First, the 
operation of a business is a call option: poor outcomes are truncated because of the possibility of 
exit.  The value of this option increases with a mean-preserving spread in outcomes.  As such, 
higher variance should lead to more firms taking bets on potential productivity-increasing 
activities like IT investment.  There is some evidence that this is happening, but the literature has 
yet to show this definitively.  Second, if there is an upward trend in productivity dispersion, will 
the forces of selection stem this spread?  If so, when?  Will a shakeout be strong enough to drive 
dispersion back to its previous level?  Third, is this increase in variance something specific about 
IT capital, or is it a broader feature of general purpose technologies?  Historical evidence would 
be very informative here.  For example, did the diffusion of the electric motor in the early 20
th 
Century also increase in the variance in productivity outcomes across businesses?  Or even when 
a particular industry experiences a revolution in its standard technology, does this lead to 
temporary increases in productivity dispersion followed by a shakeout? 
 
Can we predict innovation based on market conditions?  Here I speak of innovation broadly—
product and process innovation, measured or unmeasured by formal R&D numbers.  This 
question is in some ways a corollary to the one above about quantifying and predicting the split 
between within-producer and between-producer productivity growth.  Within-productivity 
growth is in many cases not simply the passive accumulation of efficiency; it comes in part as a 
result of the active innovative efforts of producers.  What market or technological factors 
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 determine how large innovative activity will be?  Can we predict whether product or process 
innovation will dominate, based on market features? 
 
The nature of intangible capital.  Many of the primary drivers of productivity naturally create 
persistence in productivity levels at plants and firms.  These include learning-by-doing; 
innovative efforts; and in many cases investment in higher quality managerial, labor, or capital 
inputs.  An easy way to explain such persistence is to think of these productivity enhancements 
as resulting from producers’ investments in intangible capital—know-how about their businesses 
that is embodied in the organization.  This conceptual structure also highlights how productivity 
gains sourced in intangible capital can also be thought of, along with managerial and unobserved 
factor qualities, as arising from mismeasured inputs.  If one really could measure intangible 
capital (which, alas, is inherently difficult given its nature), the productivity differences arising 
from such sources could be explained. 
Understanding how such intangible capital stocks are built and sustained would shed light 
on many productivity-related issues for this reason.  Such insights would also speak toward 
active literatures on the subject in macroeconomics and finance.  How much uncertainty is 
inherent in intangible capital investment?  What is the distribution of rates of return across 
producers, and what predicts them?  Is intangible capital fully excludable, or are there spillovers 
to other firms?  How well do R&D measures capture investment in intangibles?  Are there other 
proxies that could augment such measures? 
 
Management vs. managers.  We know more about the role of management than before, but what 
about managers?  Some good work on CEOs aside, we don’t really know if good managerial 
practices matter enough to attain productivity gains, or whether they are complementary to the 
skills of those who implement them.  If they are complements, what skills matter?  Are they built 
by experience, tenure in the industry or on the job, education, or something else?  Understanding 
these issues might also help to pin down the causal nature of management practices.  If good 
management practices reflect in large part the fact that they are what good managers do, then the 
causal impact might be limited.  On the other extreme, if managers don’t seem to matter at all, 





A plea for data.  Data availability is not a research question, but it is crucial for answering the 
questions posed above.  Virtually everything discussed in this survey we now know because 
detailed data on production practices was available.  But many of these data sets were originally 
collected by statistical agencies for the purpose of constructing aggregates.  Their ability to offer 
insights into what happens at the micro level was in many ways a happy externality.  Now that 
we know the value of the knowledge that such information can generate, economists should push 
for more directed efforts to measure business-level production practices.  This could include, for 
example, more data on managers and management practices, business-level prices, input quality 
measures, proxies for intangible capital, non-R&D innovation spending, and so on.  Obviously, 
collecting such data is costly, and this sort of push will involve tradeoffs for statistical agencies 
or a willingness of researchers to pay private companies for the collection efforts.  Nevertheless, 
it seems clear that there is much to be gained in exchange for those costs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  The research into the productivity differences across businesses has come a long way 
since Bartelsman and Doms (2000) surveyed the literature a decade ago.  We know more about 
what causes the measured differences in productivity, and how factors both internal and external 
to the plant or firm shape the distribution.  These insights have been applied to research 
questions in numerous fields. 
  That said, there is still plenty to be learned.  Fortunately, I see no sign that the rate at 
which researchers accumulate knowledge in this area is slowing.  I am excited to see what the 
next several years bring in this research agenda, as the content of 2020’s survey unfolds. References 
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